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and the Expediency of Sound
Veit Erlmann
On March 26, 2010, a defiant Julius Malema, then president of 
the ANC Youth League, the youth wing of South Africa’s former 
liberation movement and current governing party ANC (African 
National Congress), stepped out of the building of the South Gauteng 
( Johannesburg) High Court to address a throng of his supporters. 
They had assembled to protest the charges that were brought against 
him for having sung a song: ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ (Shoot the Boer). Under 
subsection 1 of s 16 of the South African Constitution, the indictment 
stated, Malema’s right to freedom of expression did not extend to 
‘a. propaganda for war; b. incitement of imminent violence; or c. 
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, 
and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.’ Surrounded by Nelson 
Mandela’s ex-spouse Winnie Madikizela Mandela and other ANC 
officials, Malema urged the crowd to respect the court proceedings: ‘As 
we march here outside, demonstrate, protest in support of our songs, 
we must be disciplined.’ And in a demonstration of just what he meant 
by respect and discipline, he launched – yet again - into a rousing 
rendering of ‘Dubul’ ibhunu.’ But instead of singing ‘kill the Boer,’ he 
changed the lyrics to ‘kiss the Boer.’ 
In this paper I follow the song as it meandered through an 
intricate topography of cases, rules and regulations ranging from the 
common-law crime of high treason, apartheid “anti-terrorism” and 
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“anti-communism” law, post-apartheid constitutional law and the 
Broadcasting Code of Conduct. Yet despite the stark contrast between 
these doctrines and the wider historical and political circumstances in 
which ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ figured there is one constant that unites the legal 
construction of the song: the absence of sound. The article is divided 
into six sections. I begin with a relatively lengthy discussion of the 
key claims and concepts guiding the inquiry. In the second part of the 
article I move on to examine one of the key trials of the late apartheid 
period in which eleven leaders of the ANC-led alliance called United 
Democratic Front (UDF) were charged with high treason for having 
given speeches and having sung ‘revolutionary’ songs - including 
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ – in order to incite to acts of treason, violence, and 
‘dissent between races’ (S v Ramgobin & others 1985 (3) SA 587 (N), 
Indictment). This will be followed in the third and fourth parts by a 
discussion of Malema’s brush with the law over the public performance 
of the song in 2011. In the fifth part I discuss a hearing that was held 
in the summer of 2017 at the Broadcasting Complaints Commission 
of South Africa (BCCSA) over an episode in the wildly popular soap 
Isidingo depicting a particularly graphic example of hate speech and 
attempted murder, complete with a lynch mob intoning ‘Dubul’ ibhunu.’ 
(The discussion of the first case is based on my having served as a witness 
for the defense and on recently discovered court papers of that trial. 
For the BCCSA case I rely on my role as a participant observer of the 
hearing.) I close with some preliminary thoughts on how attempts at 
countering hate speech in music and other creative practices may not 
only end up regenerating the politics of hate but also undermine the 
possibility of a critique of hate and violence that goes beyond liberal 
visions of an ideal public sphere and constitutional constraints on the 




In his groundbreaking book Acoustic Jurisprudence. Listening to the Trial 
of Simon Bikindi, which examines the role of sound and music in the 
trial of the popular singer Simon Bikindi and his role in the 1994 
Rwanda genocide, James Parker states that law is ‘never without the 
problem of sound.’ (2015: 2) The ‘problem,’ he elaborates, is nowhere 
more apparent than in the attention given to the voice in judicial 
speech. Thus, on the one hand the Bikindi court reproduced some 
of the most entrenched (Western) stereotypes of the voice as the 
medium par excellence of logos and, hence, as the crucial mechanism 
through which the Tribunal secured the connection – the ‘expressive 
chain’ – between Bikindi’s genocidal intent, his words and the listeners 
who tuned into radio RTLM’s non-stop Tutsi-baiting and Bikindi’s 
songs (Parker 2015: 118). But on the other hand, it was through a 
‘sophisticated rhetorical, grammatological and, moreover, specifically 
jurisprudential technique’ that the acoustic qualities of the voice were 
left unsaid (ibid: 122). In other words: ‘in the process of ‘giving voice’ 
to speech, the [Bikindi] Tribunal did as much as it could to quieten it.’ 
(ibid: 123) This paradox haunts the project of an acoustic jurisprudence, 
compelling scholars to engage in two mutually dependent exercises: 
to ‘think sonically’ (ibid: 212) by uncovering a previously unheard 
dimension of legal thought and practice, and conversely, to ‘listen 
jurisprudentially’ by ‘attending to the peculiar dilemmas and techniques 
of legal judgment.’ (ibid: 213) 
In what follows I want to amplify Parker’s argument by suggesting 
that the precarious entanglement of sonic presences and absences 
constitutes law’s very condition of possibility. Law’s ‘problem,’ then, is 
not owed to the exclusion of sound from legal discourse or to a lack of 
aural sensibility. Nor is it resolved solely by gestures of interdisciplinary 
reciprocity. What do I mean by this? Earlier, in a contribution to Sound 
Objects, a collection of essays edited by Ray Chow and James Steintrager, 
I invoked Julia Kristeva’s work on abjection to highlight this enabling 
rather than diminishing function of law’s sonic indetermination 
(Erlmann 2019, Kristeva 1982). ‘Sound,’ I argued there, may function 
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as what she called an ‘abject,’ a phenomenon whose conceptual and 
perceptual instability is a necessary condition of the subject’s desire 
for identity by maintaining a firm separation between self and other. 
Kristeva’s concept was attractive as an analytical category because it 
seemed to offer an alternative to Freud’s views on repression as resulting 
from a subject’s desire for a forbidden object. For Kristeva, it is the 
antecedent ambiguity of the subject-object relation itself that is being 
repressed. Hence, the return of repressed things like uncontrollable 
body fluids does not recall specific traumas as much as it evokes the 
fragility of the borders separating the inside from the outside. And it 
is these unstable boundaries that form the space proper of the abject. 
Building on this premise, it seemed to make sense to examine 
the intersection of the sonic abject with a range of theorisations of 
voice, speech and language such as Shoshana Felman’s ‘scandalous’ 
speech act (Felman 1983); Kristeva’s work on poetic language and 
the preverbal, ‘rhythmic’ chora; Judith Butler’s theory of hate speech 
and the ‘incongruity of the speaking body’ that remains ‘uncontained 
by any of its speech acts,’ (1997:155); and crucially, with more recent 
developments in the burgeoning field of sound studies centered on 
the ‘ontology of sound’ and sound as an object. As my earlier article, 
however, did not progress beyond some rather preliminary thoughts, 
I wish to widen the scope of this inquiry by taking the argument into 
a slightly different direction. Rather than presuming the abjection of 
sound to be a priori of securing law’s self-identity, I am approaching 
the sonic abject from its opposite or, if you will, from the subject-
point of Kristeva’s subject-object-abject triad by attending to law’s 
instability, tentativeness, limits and failures in asserting its authority 
over sound. In other words, instead of conceiving of abjection as a 
preexisting condition for the law, I stress the contingent, incomplete, 
even capricious nature of legal strategies of sonic abjection in dealing 
with the notorious difficulties created by hate speech. Or, following 
Stanley Fish’s controversial essay ‘The Law Wishes to Have a Formal 
Existence,’ I see law as ‘continually creating and recreating itself out 
of the very materials and forces it is obliged, by the very desire to be 
law, to push away’ (Fish 1999: 181).
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I call this self-reproduction of the law out of the abjection of sound 
the expediency of sound. However, in contrast to the conventional 
association with unscrupulous self-gratification, and opportunistic 
political maneuvering or just plain usefulness, the way I deploy the term 
is inspired by its more neglected etymological roots. More than a mere 
rhetorical device or means toward an end, it is the ordering function of 
sound that I highlight. As an expedient, sound allows the law to put its 
house in order and to represent law to itself. In other words, it is “good 
to think with.” Consequently, in the sections that follow I focus less on 
the doctrinal aspects or justifications of hate speech regulation and more 
on the procedural and probative work the abjection of sound actually 
does in different judicial contexts. But before I enter into a detailed 
analysis of this work, I need to introduce three additional concepts.
The first concept, agency, has competing meanings in legal discourse 
and critical, post-structuralist scholarship. In commercial law, for 
instance, agency refers to contractual and non-contractual relationships 
between a principal and an agent who acts on the authority – whether 
express, implied or apparent – of the former. In the context of criminal 
and international criminal law, the term refers to the ‘innocent agency’ 
in a criminal act that is committed by an agent who himself may not 
have mens rea or the capacity to commit a crime. The point that interests 
me most about these forms of agency is their mediating quality. Agency 
here is not inherent in only one actor, but a function of relationships 
in which several actors are entangled at different levels of liability. 
By contrast, there does not appear to be a corresponding concept of 
responsibility in either Felman’s, Kristeva’s or Butler’s work. A subject 
whose speech always and already is but one link in an endless chain of 
repeatable enunciations beyond her control cannot be said to exercise 
the absolute agency of the autonomous, self-possessing individual 
imagined by law. Yet, by the same token, agency cannot be delegated to 
a surrogate agent who might be held accountable because of the alleged 
proximity of her speech act to an effect. Agency and responsibility, in 
critical theory, can never be traced to an original moment; they are 
always deferred indefinitely. 
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Butler did, however, elaborate an alternative concept of agency, one 
that may prove useful in securing a more prominent position of sound 
in legal discourse. In a series of by now canonical formulations, she 
has suggested that by uncoupling the speech act from the sovereign 
subject, agency may be rethought in novel ways: ‘agency begins where 
sovereignty wanes’ (Butler 1997: 15-16). By this she means that rather 
than demolishing agency, the critique of the ‘conceit’ of sovereignty 
opens up the possibility for a new sense of agency to emerge. Not only 
does this agency more fully acknowledge the constitution of the subject 
in language in general and its subjugation in hate speech in particular, it 
may also enhance our responsibility for that speech. The responsibility 
of the one who utters hate speech consists of ‘negotiating the legacies 
of usage that constrain and enable that speaker’s speech’ (ibid: 27). But 
at the same time this responsibility – ‘afflicted with impurity from the 
start’ – also puts the speaking subject in an ethical bind, one in which 
the question of how best to use speech is unanswerable without prior 
consideration being given to the fundamental aporia between language 
as exceeding the speaking subject on the one hand and this very ‘excess’ 
making possible the speech of the subject on the other hand (ibid: 28). 
Of course, for Butler that antinomy can no more be dissolved by fiat 
than agency simply follows from a sovereign will. In fact, there is not 
only no escape from the dilemma of the concurrently subject-exceeding 
and speech-enabling language, its very existence is the condition of 
possibility for confronting hate speech. The counter-appropriation 
of injurious speech for Butler is therefore squarely located in the 
intersection of the semiotic and the social, in practices of resignification 
and recontextualisation. Ironically, it is this theory of linguistic agency 
that also puts her argument in close proximity to the very push for legal 
remedy against hate speech that she otherwise laments. As we will see in 
the discussion of the case against Malema mentioned at the beginning, 
the court’s opinion, Malema’s shrewd rephrasing of the lyrics, and even 
some of the criticism the case occasioned from proponents of critical 




The discrepancy between legal and critical understandings of agency 
becomes perhaps even more pronounced when viewed in conjunction 
with the debate about another key concept: the harm in hate speech. 
Although it may be a uniquely American preoccupation (albeit one 
with growing import for liberal democracies elsewhere that are getting 
swept up in the resurgence of populism and extremism) situated within 
the controversy about the pros and cons of free speech protections, 
some of the points in this debate may be relevant for the topic at hand 
(Delgado-Stefancic 2019, Fish 1995, Heinze 2016, Strossen 2018, 
Matsuda et al 2019, Sorial 2012). There are two, sharply contrasting 
viewpoints. According to the first, pro-protection position, hate speech 
is just an expression like any other and therefore protected under the 
First Amendment. Implicit in this argument is the notion that the 
precise nature of the harm and its relationship to an offensive expression 
cannot always be unequivocally determined. But in a contrary, pro-
regulation perspective, that relation is much more straightforward. At 
issue here is not the causal relation between expressions of hate and 
its purported effects as much as the speech itself that might constitute 
the harm. On this view, hate speech would thus have to be viewed as 
a form of conduct or a performative act and the harm associated with 
this act-like speech as being integral to its very existence as hate speech 
(Waldron 2012). 
The latter paradigm entails important implications. Because hate 
speech might be construed as equivalent to an assault and, hence, 
the harm inherent in it as being prima facie evident, there would 
hardly have to be any reason to produce compelling evidence about 
the precise nature of the harm. Furthermore, the notion that the 
harm of hate speech is figured as inextricably interwoven with the 
‘content’ of the hate speech and that therefore any injurious effect is 
necessarily traceable to speech, dispenses with the need of considering 
any situational context such as the person of the speaker or the 
role of the listener and their potentially uneven positions of power. 
This, obviously, would not only have broader political implications 
beyond evidentiary constraints such as complicating any attempt at 
distinguishing between radical but otherwise protectable political 
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enunciations and direct incitements to violence. It might also have the 
undesired effect of disseminating or, to use one of the key terms Butler 
invokes in arguing against censorship, ‘repeating’ elements of the very 
hate speech that legal interventions are called upon to suppress in the 
first place. Likewise, by foreclosing the ‘gap’ between speech and its 
effects, the constitutive theory of hate speech might embolden forms 
of state intervention that stifle ‘nonjuridical forms of opposition, ways 
of restaging and resignifying speech in contexts that exceed those 
determined by the courts’ (Butler 1997: 23).1 
Without a doubt, despite numerous question marks and the rich 
potential for divergent interpretations (known to every philosopher and 
student of the law trying to argue their way around First Amendment 
absolutism), these interventions offer suggestive leads for crafting 
a theory of sound as a legal expedient. At the same time, they are 
noteworthy for their utter silence on the place of sound in injurious 
speech. For even where Felman, Kristeva and Butler and others 
occasionally stray into the physicality of the voice – the breath, vocal 
cords, glottis and the resonant spaces of the mouth – they tend to do 
so by summarily substituting the voice for the sound it generates. The 
question thus remains as to the logic by which sound may be producing 
harmful effects. Is it in the form of what John L.Austin (1962) termed 
perlocution or is, alternatively, sound a type of illocution and, thus, 
the injury itself? 
This is also the question that preoccupies a strand of theory that 
operates under the label ‘ontology’ and here especially a variant within 
sound studies that seems to be fixated on the ‘object sound.’ One of the 
most influential statements to date of this trend is Steve Goodman’s 
(2010) book Sonic Warfare: Sound, Affect, and the Ecology of Fear.2 
Everything in Goodman’s ‘ecology of fear’ is alive with vibration. It is 
through the visceral effect of vibration, he argues, that sound acts on 
bodies. But in so doing, vibration always precedes consciousness and 
signification by a split second. Thus detached from the possibility of 
any cognitive response, this ‘vibrational force’ becomes a key vehicle 
of contemporary forms of power to reproduce themselves by arousing a 
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diffuse array of primal affects such as fear. So far Goodman’s argument 
appears to extend to sound Butler’s concept of language as the condition 
of possibility for the (speaking) subject, as that which ‘precedes and 
exceeds the subject’ (Butler 1997: 28). And, like Butler, Goodman 
is interested in developing alternative strategies for the formation 
of oppositional subjectivities. Yet unlike Butler and echoing Brian 
Massumi (2002), such strategies cannot be based in any rationally 
guided, non-affective responses such as the first’s highly self-aware 
‘re-signifying.’ Power can only be resisted by what Goodman calls a 
‘politics of frequency,’ through an experimental aesthetics and practice 
such as Afrofuturism or electronic dance music (both of which also 
inform Goodman’s own work as a DJ) that transduce ‘bad vibes into 
something more constructive’ (2010: 73).
In response to the latter point, Brian Kane, possibly sound 
ontology’s most discerning critic, has pointed out that Goodman fails 
to explain how a counter-hegemonic politics of frequency may be 
substantiated merely by shifting from the ontologically antecedent, 
fear-inducing vibrations to the decidedly more pleasurable sensations 
produced by EDM (Kane 2015: 7). Rather what ensues from ontologies 
such as Goodman’s is anything but counter-hegemonic: a concern with 
boundaries. ‘Most ontological claims are less arguments than assertions 
or commitments,’ Kane writes and, as such, these assertions serve to 
stabilise claims where the conclusion is already predetermined and, in 
this manner, ‘make legible the epistemic and axiological views of those 
who do the positioning’ (2019: 67). The question then, Kane goes on to 
argue, is not so much what this scholarship might tell us about the being 
or mere thereness of sound but how the ontological reduction of sound 
and the attendant ‘phantasmagoric occultation of production’ might 
be countered by recognising sounds as ‘sedimentation of historical and 
social forces’ (2019: 68).3
The words ‘sedimentation’ and ‘forces’ may be poorly chosen here, 
for sound is being ossified as the product of a mechanism depriving 
it of any agency of its own. But as Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has 
taught us, history, culture, society, or nature are no more given ‘forces’ 
283
‘Shoot the Boer’ – Hate Speech, 
Law and the Expediency of Sound
or domains of reality than sound is an object. Rather, they are ways of 
connecting disparate phenomena and consolidating them into more 
or less durable entities that then become operational as ‘matters of 
concern’ for different epistemological and practical interests (Latour 
2005: 113). On this view, then, sound – physically and figuratively born 
from friction – might more productively have to be understood not as 
an object, medium, let alone as a subject. Rather I propose to consider 
sound as a ‘mediator’ in the ANT sense of the term: as a somewhat 
evanescent construct translating, transforming and modifying what it 
is supposed to carry: language, music, and even the very meaning and 
harm of hate (Latour 2005: 38).   
But what, precisely, are the connections with the law sound might 
afford and vice versa? What is it about sound’s promiscuity that renders 
it so fundamentally incompatible with and yet at the same time useful 
to the law? What would be the sonic, non-verbal equivalent of the harm 
in hate speech? And how might Butler’s and Goodman’s conceptions 
of creative anti-hegemonic agency square with some of the arguments 
being proffered for and against the protection of hate speech? As the 
discussion above has shown, ontological, that is, object and vibration-
centered theories of sound offer only scant guidance here. Attempting 
to translate the logic of sonic ontology into a legal one about the 
sonic harm in hate speech risks confounding the constitutive theory 
of harm (whereby harm is inherent in the injurious speech) with a 
consequentialist one according to which harm results from speech. 
What then is the way out of this conundrum? Earlier I suggested 
that we consider sound as an expedient allowing the law to do its 
work. There is a fascinating counterpart to this hypothesis in what 
anthropologist and legal scholar Annelise Riles (2005) calls law’s 
‘technicalities.’ Over the years, Riles has made a compelling case 
for a new kind of interdisciplinary relationship between law and the 
humanities that eschews the instrumentalism of Legal Realism (in 
which the legal provides the means toward extra-legal ends and the 
humanities are called upon to examine both the ends and the failures 
of the means-end rationale) in favor of a more nuanced approach 
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inspired by Science and Technology Studies (STS) and ANT. For 
instance, using the conflict of laws doctrine Riles argues that it is ‘the 
mundane technocratic dimensions of law, precisely those dimensions 
that fail to engage humanists’ theoretical, critical, or reformist passions, 
that are the most interesting artifacts of lawyerly work,’ and as such 
these dimensions are amenable to sophisticated cultural analysis (Riles 
2005: 1029). However, in order to turn a new page in the humanistic 
study of law, such cultural analysis would need to go beyond the 
conventional wisdom of socio-legal studies or Critical Legal Studies 
that legal form – much like law in toto – is but a ‘social construction’ 
or a consequence of wider ‘cultural’ trends. Form and technicality are 
not effects or byproducts of more important agents and forces, Riles 
argues, but the ‘protagonists of law’s own account’ (ibid: 975) In short, 
the humanistic study of law has to ‘account for the agency of technocratic 
legal form’ itself (ibid: 980).
Sound in hate speech cases, I suggest analogously, might be viewed 
as yet another protagonist of law’s own account. As such it not only 
allows the judicial process to move along toward resolution, it also 
makes it possible to apprehend sound’s agency without ever leaving 
the domain of the legal itself. 
2
The first reported case in which ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ features is the so-called 
Pietermaritzburg Treason Trial of 1985 (S v Ramgobin & others 1985 
(3) SA 587 (N)). It was brought by the apartheid regime against the 
leaders of the anti-apartheid umbrella organisation United Democratic 
Front (UDF) on common-law charges of treason and a variety of 
alternate charges based in apartheid legislation. The evidence presented 
by the state almost in its entirety consisted of some 35 videotapes 
(recorded by police and CNN) of what it called ‘bellicose’ speeches 
and songs – including ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ – that were delivered during 
UDF rallies. Although the trial eventually collapsed on procedural 
and evidential grounds (inaccurate translations, tapes that had been 
tempered with, and poor sound quality) and the state focused on the 
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lyrics of these songs throughout, the arguments during pleadings are 
instructive because they point toward some of the ambiguities of the 
sonic abject and the expediency of sound that this essay is about. 
From the outset, the defense honed in on the state’s inability to 
prove that the videos were the direct result of these witnesses having 
observed the accused initiating and participating in the singing and if 
so, to what extent mens rea might be ascertained on this evidence. Here 
are some typical examples from the further particulars illustrating the 
defense’s strategy:
‘Is it alleged that each of the Accused heard and understood each of 
the songs and slogans?’ 
Or: 
‘Is it alleged that on each occasion specified in the relevant Schedule 
the Accused whose name is stated as being present on the particular 
occasion of the meeting concerned was also present when the song or 
slogan was sung or uttered?’
In a similar vein, the following passages from the cross-examination 
of one Izak Daniel de Vries, a self-styled expert of ‘revolution’ and one 
of the state’s key witnesses, illustrate the defense’s attempt to counter the 
charge of treason by undermining the idea that the mere performance 
of certain songs reveals a ‘hostile intent’ to commit or incite to treason:
MR MAHOMED [counsel]: M’Lord, the only other observation, 
I think, which might be relevant is that the singing we saw in the 
beginning of that video appears to have been before the commencement 
of the meeting itself. […]
MILNE, J P [judge]: Yes, we agree that that’s correct.
MR GEY VAN PITTIUS [prosecutor]: Well M’Lord, perhaps 
I should add then, then of course after the meeting had finished, 
then again the singing starts […] The observations that we need to 
make, so it seems to me, are not very many in view of the fact that 
the transcripts helpfully, in our view, purport to indicate not merely 
speech but gestures, movement, singing, and so on […] 
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MILNE, J P: Really perhaps one can clarify it by saying that the 
singing […] actually appears to take place outside the hall in which 
the meeting actually occurred. 
MR MAHOMED: I’m quite happy as long as – I think it’s common 
enough that the singing we see in the beginning of the video, whether 
inside or outside the hall, is before the commencement of the meeting 
itself. […]
MR MAHOMED: Because M’Lord, we will point out to Your 
Lordship and submit in due course that that seems to be a recurring 
thing which happens at all these meetings. The singing actually goes 
on before the meeting starts and it’s a way in which the audience keeps 
itself occupied.
Further on there is this exchange:  
MR MAHOMED: People often enjoy themselves with song. 
MILNE J P: Oh yes, certainly.
MR MAHOMED: And we will be actually having expert evidence if 
we ever reach that stage, to say what the purpose of this sort of song is 
in African tradition, but that there was a mood of anger, with respect, 
is a correct observation. 
MILNE, J P: Oh yes. That was the prevailing mood. 
MR MAHOMED: Yes, but it ..(intervention) 
MILNE, J P: I don’t mean it was continuous.
MR MAHOMED: Yes, it is intermittently interrupted by a lot of good 
cheer and laughter and smiles as well, particularly during the singing. 
I noticed on the face of the singers and the gumboot dancers and so 
forth, there was a considerable merriment and enjoyment.
MILNE, J P: Yes, of course a lot of that was not observed by us because 
it was agreed that it was not relevant and it was just — if I can use the 
technical term – put on the fast-forward button. […]
MR MAHOMED: Yes, just to get the total picture M’Lord. One 
perhaps looks at these people participating in these songs and it 
undoubtedly serves a kind of entertainment and amusement value as 
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well, regardless of the words, that one smiles oneself; one watches; one 
is affected by the rhythm and the tempo and the beat and the melody. 
So anger is true as a prevailing mood M’Lord, but it had these other 
features as well.
MILNE, J P: Yes. Perhaps one could put it this way Mr Mahomed, 
although we received the impression that that was the prevailing mood, 
it’s not necessarily the continuous mood.
There are several aspects in these brief moments of wrangling over 
the admissibility of evidence that require close reading. At the most 
basic level of criminal procedure, the question about when and where 
the singing took place and where the witnesses were during those 
moments was not only directed at the potential for hearsay (which in 
turn resulted in long hours being spent debating the reliability of the 
recordings); it also enabled the defense to rebut the notion that the 
accused acted with mens rea when they were not even present during 
the singing  and, hence, their liability as principals was all but certain. 
By far the most noteworthy aspect of the cross-examination, however, 
is the manner in which the defense time and again inserted sound 
as an object of legal scrutiny in its own right.  Invoking ‘song’ as a 
placeholder for what in essence was a discussion about the audibility 
of sound within a given time-space, the attorney adroitly redirected 
the court’s attention from the accused’s individual actions toward a 
more diffuse situation of collective responsibility. For instance, one of 
the conditions of ‘hostile intent’ as the central element of the crime of 
treason is that it consists of an ‘overt act’ aimed against the state, such 
as organising an armed insurrection. But, in another sense, the overt 
act may also be construed as being little more than a ‘manifestation’ of 
hostile intent, such as in an individual writing, speaking and singing 
words that as such do not incite others to treason.4 This possibility, 
blatantly at odds with the definition of treason at common law, is the 
reason why the defense sought to stress the ‘entertainment’ aspect of 
the singing, at one point even hinting at the notion (which I had rather 
frivolously recommended to counsel) that such collective ‘letting off 




Another example of the drift toward sound may be seen in the 
defense’s attempt to deflect attention from singing as intentional 
utterance. By raising the question of the accused’s hearing, the defense 
adroitly widens the interpretive frame by shifting the focus from the 
intention of a singular speaking or singing subject toward a more 
dialogic situation in which the mere fact of being within ear-shot of an 
utterance proves culpability. Hearing others sing the allegedly ‘bellicose’ 
‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’ this line of reasoning seems to suggest, displaces the 
accused from the position of a solitary, willfully speaking subject 
‘inciting’ an amorphous crowd and ‘advocating’ a certain course of 
action toward one of social embeddedness in which individual volition 
and collective action are submerged in a heterogeneous sonosphere. 
3
More than 30 years after the 1985 Treason Trial ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ 
resurfaced in a totally different political and legal setting. In 2010 
Afriforum, an organisation that describes itself as an NGO defending 
the minority rights of Afrikaners (i.e. ‘Boers’) by demanding that 
murders of white farmers be classified as racially motivated ‘genocide,’ 
filed a complaint against Malema with the South African Commission 
on Human Rights for having publicly performed ‘Dubul ’ibhunu.’ 
While the Commission ruled that the phrase ‘Kill the Boer’ did not 
qualify as hate speech but was simply an example of free expression, on 
appeal the Equality Court of South Gauteng set aside that decision. 
While Malema defended his actions by maintaining that the words 
were intended to symbolise the destruction of white oppression (the 
former regime) rather than to indicate the literal intention to shoot 
the Boers, the court disagreed. Both the words and the ‘song,’ it 
found, violated s 10 of the Equality Act which prohibits words that 
‘demonstrate a clear intention to be (a) be hurtful; (b) be harmful or 
to incite harm; (c) promote or propagate hatred’ and as such they did 
not fall under s 16 of the Constitution that excludes hate speech from 
protection (Afriforum and Another v Malema and Others 2011 (6) SA 
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240 (EqC) 20968/2010).
Afriforum has since become the subject of intense debate, as 
evinced for instance by the cartoon below. Here South Africa’s leading 
cartoonist Jonathan Shapiro (aka ‘Zapiro’), perhaps not very subtly, 
depicts Malema on the left as he sings ‘Dubula’ and a high-ranking 
member of the South African Police Service on the right orders a group 
of officers to ‘shoot to kill.’ The difference between both ‘chants,’ Shapiro 
seems to suggest, is the number of casualties (or absence thereof) they 
are said to have caused.
Fig. 1 Two Buffoons Singing Their Chant © 2014 Zapiro. Originally 
published on Daily Maverick. Re-published with permission - For more 
Zapiro cartoons visit www.zapiro.com
Legal scholars for their part have attacked the Afriforum court for 
failing to deal with, as Joel Modiri, drawing on core tenets of Critical 
Race Theory, puts it ‘the ideological nature of law and the politics 
of race in post-1994 South Africa’ (2013: 274).5 While Zapiro’s is a 
consequentialist argument predicated on the ‘gap’ between speech and 
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alleged harm, Modiri points to the jurisprudential flaws underpinning 
that argument from the outset. In his decision, he writes, Lamont J 
had refused to consider the ‘black point of view.’ Instead of a fair, 
objective legal outcome, the judgment implicitly perpetuates entrenched 
traditions of South African formalist legal reasoning and its equivalent 
in the politics of liberal-democratic governance and race neutrality. 
For instance, it is oblivious to the fact that in contexts of pervasive 
and persistent racism the law is incapable of race-neutral application, 
itself being the product of a racially defined political and economic 
order. Furthermore, and most crucially for the question posed in this 
paper, the Afriforum court operated on the basis of what Modiri calls 
‘structural determinism’ in which the ‘structure of legal thought and 
the prevailing legal culture determines its content and thus also who 
benefits from it and whose interests and values it protects and reflects’ 
(Modiri 2013: 286). For instance, the unwavering belief in the precision 
and self-revealingness of words and texts at the heart of legal thought 
disregards the possibility of shifting intentionalities behind the singing 
of ‘Dubula ‘ibhunu,’ such as reviving the legacy of ‘struggle songs;’ to 
legitimise Malema’s claims to leadership by connecting current conflicts 
to the morally justified anti-apartheid struggle; or, to use the song as 
a non-violent expression of ‘disciplined’ dissent.
Modiri’s critique and the intellectual environment that nourishes 
it deserves more attention than I can offer in this essay.6 Instead, I am 
limiting my observations to one point; to the fact namely that he – 
and other critics of Afriforum and the regulation of hate speech more 
broadly – neglect to consider the judge’s explicit inclusion of ‘song’ 
as a category of evidence determining hate speech. Yet upon reading 
several lengthy passages in the opinion, the observer is none the wiser 
as to what exactly the court understood ‘song’ to mean. Here are some 
examples: ‘[54] Song is a form of verbal art which people use both for 
emotional release and also for manipulation of others.’ (Afriforum and 
Another: 32) While the court dwells on the ‘emotional release’ part of 
song at greater length elsewhere, several paragraphs later the judge 
goes into more detail about how precisely song may be used for the 
manipulation of others. In a move familiar from debates in which 
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cultural contingency is rendered as naturally given, he writes: 
[64] The song mutates as and when different people sing it and as and 
when the mood or occasion which is celebrated changes…. This is 
completely natural and in accordance with the way in which these songs 
are used to express the feelings of persons who sing the song (ibid.: 38).
The strategy becomes even more transparent two paragraphs later 
where the court expands on the notion of mutation, tracing the origin 
of ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ to a recording by one Collins Chabane. 
 [66] The song sounds very different when Malema sings it to what it 
sounds like on the recording of Mr Chabane. When Malema sings 
the song, it is quite clearly a chant.  Malema sings the first sentence, 
the audience sings the chorus. The words are sung in a rhythmic chant 
using a staccato. The effect is to produce clipped calls and clipped 
responses. When the song is heard on the recording of Mr Chabane, 
the song is played legato and sounds much like a gentle lullaby or hymn. 
The words remain the same. However, if the words are not understood, 
then the song appears innocuous from its tone and delivery (ibid.: 38).
This, the court goes on to state referring to an expert brief by an 
unnamed musicologist, is because
historically struggle songs had been developed by persons who 
formulated them making use of existing music. Often, for example, 
the melody of hymns was used. The person who wrote the song then 
adapted the words of the hymn by replacing them with his own words. 
A person who heard the singing but did not understand the words 
would think that a hymn was being sung if he was familiar with the 
tune of the hymn. However, in truth and in fact, the words were 
different and conveyed the message of the person who had written 
them (ibid.: 39).
Musicologists might cringe at this bumbling foray into South 
African musical history. For what Lamont J references here is a tradition 
of South African ‘protest song’ that originated in the late colonial era 
during the second part of the nineteenth and consisted of two broad 
genres: a mournful tradition, exemplified in part by ‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’ 
rooted in four-part Christian hymnody lamenting the loss of land and 
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freedom while simultaneously asserting black South Africans’ humanity 
and dignity on the one hand; and a more defiant body of songs based 
on indigenous, traditional forms such as ihubo ‘war songs’ on the other 
hand (Erlmann 1985).
The ‘chant’ that Malema intoned on the steps of the South Gauteng 
High Court, however, is a relatively recent phenomemon having 
emerged during the dying days of apartheid as the UDF and, from 
1989, scores of former guerilla fighters returning from their camps in 
neighboring countries such as Mozambique and Angola performed 
it in combination with a type of military drill referred to as toyi-toyi.
Yet musical history apart, there is more to the court’s line of 
reasoning than simple ignorance. The court wants to have it both 
ways. On the one hand, ‘song’ is construed as the site of unlimited 
transformation, going from a lullaby or hymn to ‘rhythmic chant.’ 
At the same time, however, with the ‘words’ remaining unchanged, 
‘songs’ may trick the unsuspecting listener into mistaking their true 
essence. Conversely, when in an identical ‘song’ existing texts are 
replaced with new lyrics in contrafact-like fashion, the effect on the 
judge’s hypothetical listener is the reverse: the ‘song’ retains its original 
identity. ‘Song’ is thus hypostatised into something akin to what 
Michel Foucault (in a different context) called the ‘author function;’ a 
principle that impedes the production, reproduction and proliferation 
of meaning. Or, to draw an analogy with Kristeva’s reading of Louis-
Ferdinand Céline, ‘song’ to the Afriforum court is the ‘grammatical’ 
that prevents language to ‘fly off its handle’ (Kristeva 1982: 189). 
Leaving aside the improbability of the vast majority of South Africans 
being monolingual, the entire purpose of the court’s reasoning is all 
too familiar then. It is to stabilise the ‘verbal’ as the sole repository of 
intention by situating ‘song’ within a nexus linking a knowing author 
and an ideal, linguistically competent (‘reasonable’) listener capable 
of seeing through the machinations of the Malemas of the world in 
manipulating ‘song.’ 
But there might also be an additional layer to the holding. By 
referring to Malema’s version as ‘chant’ Lamont may be drawing on 
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one of colonial mythology’s most persistent tropes of African musical 
aesthetics as somehow being stuck in a pre-historic, pre-’song’ past, 
one in which music, unlike that of the ‘civilised’ present, is primarily 
thought to be determined by its practical function. ‘Chant,’ then, is more 
action than representation or, to put it in Walter  Benjamin’s terms, it 
is mimesis in its primordial form predating ‘nonsensuous similarity’ 
(Benjamin 1999). Viewed through this lens, ‘chant’ might  provide an 
opening for a different and more sono-centric interpretation of the term 
‘incitement of imminent violence’ in subsection 1b of s 16 of the South 
African Constitution. The Afriforum court might be inadvertently 
gesturing toward a notion of ‘song’ as itself constituting incitement 
and violence all at once. In other words, as I mentioned earlier what is 
at stake in Malema’s performance of ‘Shoot the Boer’ is not the ‘words’ 
but the performative act itself as exceeding verbally articulated intent. 
With the court thus essentially putting the twin concepts of 
‘song’ and ‘chant’ up for grabs, it may be useful to ponder the political 
consequences of Afriforum v.Malema. The ‘chant’ revived by Malema, 
I argue, is one if not the most important contribution he has made 
to the political debate, creating a type of political aesthetics hitherto 
unknown in post-apartheid South Africa. At a time when political 
discourse degenerates into an empty technocratic lingo that justifies the 
increasingly draconic means (deregulation, privatisation, surveillance 
and government secrecy) that South Africans are being asked to put 
up with by pointing to their alleged benefits somewhere down the 
line, Malema and his band of Economic Freedom Fighters have taken 
blunt talk to a new level. After former South African President Jacob 
Zuma had been found to embezzle public funds to upgrade his rural 
home with a swimming pool, Malema’s minions regularly disrupted 
speeches by government officials with the slogan ‘Pay Back the Money.’ 
There is a parallel between this twitterisation of politics and the 
instrumentalisation of ‘song’ as a mere vehicle of a signified to be 
invoked or discarded at will in the attempt of stabilising law’s fragile 
authority in distinguishing hate speech from protected expression. As 
anthropologist Rosalind Morris views it, these types of intervention 
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in and outside of the state-sanctioned public sphere ‘have incited 
fantasies of an immediacy that would transcend the pitfalls and the 
limits of all forms of mediation, whether political or technological’ 
(2017: 123). Thus, it is not just that the Afriforum court subscribed to 
a profoundly Western, romantic idea in assuming that the meaning 
of a song is permanently and unalterably inscribed in the words and 
that, hence, authorial intent and work are identical. Nor is it that by 
thereby ignoring the possibility that music lives its own deedful life 
independent of the doer, the criterion of ‘immediacy’ in some definitions 
of incitement to violence risks to become redundant. By overlooking the 
massive shifts in popular culture toward quasi-illocutionary practices 
in which the boundary between announcement and the announced 
deed, between speech and the ‘thing’ spoken about is eroding, the 
court blinded itself to the troubling possibility that any form of sound-
based communication aspiring to what Morris calls ‘immediacy and 
communicative fullness’ given the right target, may constitute hate 
speech (2017: 134).  
4
Soon after the court handed down its decision that Malema had violated 
the hate speech provisions of the Equality Act, the parties entered into 
a mediation agreement in which Malema and the ANC (the second 
respondent) acknowledged that some words in certain ‘struggle songs’ 
go directly against ‘morality of society’ and are hurtful to minority 
groups. Yet fast forward several more years and ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ is alive 
and well. On May 17, 2017 the Broadcasting Complaints Commission 
of South Africa heard complaints of hate speech and incitement to 
violence submitted by a large group of viewers of the wildly popular 
soap titled Isidingo (The Need) (BCCSA, 11/2017, van Wyk and several 
others v. SABC3). In one of the episodes of the series one of the main 
characters of the show, allegorically named Sechaba (‘Nation’), visits 
the grave of his father located on a farm owned by Afrikaners. (Black 
farm laborers were commonly buried on the farm they had been 
working on for their entire lives.) There, Sechaba is confronted by two 
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farmers who, after having hurled racial abuse at him, brutally assault 
him and, rather than shooting him, bury him alive. While Sechaba 
survives the ordeal, the community of farm laborers, armed with clubs, 
assegais and torches, and singing ‘Dubul’ ibhunu,’ stage a march to a 
hotel where the two farmers are hiding out, demanding that they come 
out, presumably to face imminent death at the hands of the angry mob.
Hearings of the BCCSA tribunal are designed to give complainants 
an opportunity to engage with representatives of the responding 
broadcaster directly and for the commissioners to come to a decision 
about the complaint in terms of the industry’s self-elected code 
of conduct. Over the years the tribunal has heard around a dozen 
complaints about hate speech and incitement to violence, most 
notoriously the ‘AmaNdiya’ case in which the South African Human 
Rights commission argued that famed dramatist-songwriter Mbongeni 
Ngema’s song ‘AmaNdiya’ (Indians) amounted to hate speech against 
South Africans of Indian descent (BCCSA, 31/2002, SAHRC v. SABC), 
and more recently, the case of ‘Get Out,’ a hip hop track featuring 
lyrics calling for ‘people fight’ and the ‘oppressor get out,’ all to the 
accompaniment of machine gun sounds (BCCSA 05/2008, W Spies 
v SABC1).7 In the May 17 tribunal the commissioners reviewed a 
selection of the 110 or so written complaints they had received about the 
farm episode, followed by a screening of the allegedly offending scenes 
and by testimony given by one of the complainants and a senior official 
of the South African Broadcasting Service (SABC) that produces and 
airs Isidingo. Most complaints were by whites that took issue with the 
way, as one Michael Coetzee put it for example, the show ‘opened 
wounds, caused unnecessary hurt and pain and portrays white people 
(particularly farmers) as racists.’ Viewer Deon Fialkov, for his part, 
reiterating a comment he had posted earlier on Facebook, argued that 
the show ‘is only showing racism by white people’ and that ‘it doesn’t 
seem right that only one race is made out to be racist when racism 
affects every race.’8 In response, the SABC spokesperson defended 
the story as ‘intended to address an important and complex part of 
our history and the present-day South Africa,’ in hopes of speaking to 
‘the preconceived notions and stereotypes on both sides of the colour 
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divide that still needs to be addressed in order for the country to find 
healing. Its intent is to open a continuing dialogue on the issue of race 
to the benefit of all South Africans and our collective future.’ 
Predictably, after brief deliberation, the commission found that the 
scenes in question did not contravene either clause 4(1) of the Code of 
Conduct that prohibits the sanctioning or promotion of violence based 
inter alia on race or clause 4(2) that prohibits hate speech. Rather more 
startling, however, is the fact that at no point either during or after 
oral arguments did it occur to the commissioners that the singing of 
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ in the hotel scene (a clip of which was also shown) 
might provide additional evidence of the hate allegedly being advocated 
in the episode. In fact, the acoustic dimension of both the graveyard 
and the hotel scenes was ignored altogether.
5
One may speculate about the tribunal’s deafness vis-à-vis a soundtrack 
so sparse that one cannot but notice the stark contrast between the 
serenity of the graveyard scene and the raucous atmosphere in the 
hotel lobby. In the former the faint traffic noise, chirping birds, the 
sound of Sechaba shaking a snuff box and clearing the grave from the 
overgrowth of grass, and most importantly, the drone-like choral chord 
that accompanies Sechaba’s appeal for forgiveness from his father, like 
a sonic halo transfigures the scene into a quasi-religious moment of 
atonement, not unlike the post-apartheid project of nation-building 
in the name of democracy, ubuntu (human dignity) and reconciliation. 
In contrast, the hotel scene is dominated by the ‘noise’ of ‘Dubula’ 
drowning out the carefully balanced sonosphere by the grave. 
In closing, I would like to expand on the hotel scene with a view 
to highlight the ability of techniques of resignification to disrupt law’s 
desire to be itself by undermining sound’s expediency, and concurrent 
with it, to perpetuate the abrogation of political or legal mediation at the 
heart of the politics of hate.9 One notices several sonic and visual layers 
being skillfully superimposed on each other. Thus, when the mob enters 
the lobby demanding that the two farmers be handed over to them, 
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the song is no longer the much maligned ‘Dubul ’ibhunu;’ the crowd 
only intones the refrain ‘Dubula,’ other lines of the lyrics remaining 
indistinct in the background. And just in case any unsuspecting viewers 
might be unfamiliar with the meaning of the Zulu word ‘dubula’ or, 
might be irked by uncomfortable echoes of Malema’s ‘disciplined’ 
performance of ‘Dubula’ several years prior, the subtitle makes it clear 
that what they are hearing is not an ‘incitement to cause harm’ but 
merely a form of ‘protest.’ But only a moment later, as the frame shifts 
from the action filling the entire screen to something approximating 
what in literature and art is known as polyfocality, this attempt at 
cleansing the phrase from its violent connotation takes a sudden turn 
into more ambivalent terrain. An employee or guest of the hotel, in a 
kind of alienation effect, is seen taking a video of the events on his cell 
phone, only to be reprimanded by one of the intruders: ‘Hey, shove off. 
You think this is a movie?’   
Several readings of this shot suggest themselves. On the one hand, 
by making itself the object of the narrative through the ‘movie in the 
movie’ frame, the scene might be said to invite its viewers to take at 
face value the producer’s declared objective of laying bare ‘preconceived 
notions and stereotypes.’ In other words, by redirecting the audience’s 
gaze from the ‘actual’ performance of the song to a ‘movie’ of the song 
as taken and viewed by the owner of the cell phone, the scene insinuates 
that what the viewers are seeing is not an incitement to cause harm 
but a movie indeed and therefore open to interpretation. On the other 
hand, despite placing the spectator in an active, self-reflexive position 
the shot may also achieve the exact opposite of such critical media 
consumption: the possibility, namely, that real-life performances of 
‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ are indeed ‘movies.’ This is of course a bold claim. Yet, 
without wanting to minimise the legitimacy of expressions of anger in 
the face of racist abuse and racially motivated violence, the theatricality 
of such expressions is hard to overlook. Just as Malema had shrewdly 
sanitised ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ into mere wordplay by ‘resignifying’ its lyrics 
from ‘Kill the Boer’ to ‘Kiss the Boer,’ the aestheticisation of political 
dissent is part and parcel of what Morris calls the ‘ob-scenity’ of a 
type of political intervention that deliberately positions itself outside 
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or ‘off-scene’ the norms of reasoned discourse (Morris 2017: 128). But 
at the same time this flouting of the protocols of liberal democracy 
depends on them for its efficacy in creating the echo chamber of 
populist politics. Because constitutional encroachments on the freedom 
of expression always carry within themselves the barely concealed 
threat of force (alluded to in Zapiro’s cartoon above), at the hands of 
populist politicians such as Malema songs like ‘Dubul’ ibhunu’ are 
meant to goad the state into revealing its true repressive nature, and in 
turn forge a visceral sense of shared identity among those imagining 
themselves as standing in opposition to the state and its institutions. 
Sound, Morris recognises (albeit by using the word ‘song’), is crucial 
in this process. By uttering and repeating stripped-down phrases such 
as ‘Dubula,’ she argues, anyone can ‘find themselves enthralled by the 
strange sensation of speaking someone else’s words and simultaneously 
experiencing them as one’s own’ (ibid: 128). Sound, then, in its barest, 
virtually a-semantic form thus has the primary function and capacity 
to mediate (in the Actor-Network Theory sense of the word) the act 
of communication itself; to assemble words, meaning, and action into 
an alternate, movie-like reality taken for politics. 
Endnotes
1. For further criticism see Barendt 2019 and Sorial 2012: 79-80.
2. See also Chow-Steintrager 2019, Daughtry 2015, Eidsheim 2015, Hainge 
2013.
3. For another critique of ‘vibration’ as a cultural trope or ‘cosmograph’ see 
Kahn 2020.
4. For a detailed analysis of the ‘hostile intent’ doctrine in the context of the 
trial see Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights under Law 1985.
5. See also Buitendag-van Merle 2014. See also the discussion in van der 
Merwe 2013 of African National Congress v Harmse: In Re Harmse v Vawda 
(Afriforum Intervening)  2011 5 SA 460 (GSJ)  in which the High Court 
held that ‘the publication and chanting of the words Dubula ibhunu prima 
facie  satisfies the crime of incitement to commit murder.’ Van der Merve 
even goes as far as declaring: ‘One would indeed be hard pressed to deny 
a measure of similarity between the song ‘Dubula Ibhunu ‘ and the song 
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‘Tubatsembesembe ‘ (‘We will kill them all’), which was sung by Hutu 
extremists prior to the Rwandan genocide.’ (351)
6. See for instance the special issue on ‘Conquest, Constitutionalism and 
Democratic Contestations’ in the South African Journal on Human Rights 
34, 2018.
7. Another case, pending with the Human Rights Commission, is the music 
video ‘Larney Jou Poes’ by hip hop crew Dookoom, in which rapper Isaac 
Mutant exhorts a group of back farmworkers brandishing guns and forks 
to burn down the white farmer’s farm.
8. Quoted from emails received by BCCSA. I am grateful to BCCSA 
secretary Shouneez Martin for providing me with copies of these emails.
9. A similar dynamic may be at work in the music of hip-hop/rave group Die 
Antwoord and the critical reception videos such as ‘Fatty Boom Boom’ 
experienced (Haupt 2012).  
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